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Human suffering aside, traffic offenses such as speeding and hit-
and-run present a significant law enforcement problem in the area of
driver identification.' This difficulty led to the development of an
inference that the registered owner of a vehicle was operating it at
the time of an offense.2 This inference was utilized in Pennsylvania
until declared unconstitutional by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Commonwealth v. Slaybaugh.3
Inferences are valuable tools in criminal cases and may be val-
idly employed if the jury is not required to accept any fact as true,
the burden of proof is not placed on the defendant or lessened for
the prosecution, and at least a rational link exists between the proved
and presumed facts.4 When the Slaybaugh decision is analyzed in
light of these requirements, the court's determination on the consti-
tutional question is exposed as clearly erroneous.5
Absent judicial reconsideration of a criminal owner-operator in-
ference, however, three proposed alternatives for aiding enforcement
of motor vehicle provisions exist: first, a driver identification statute,
in which registered owners are required to reveal the operator's iden-
tity or risk criminal sanctions; 6 second, an implied consent statute, in
which the owner is deemed to have agreed to reveal the driver's
identity as a precondition to the issuance of a license;7 and last, a
statute that re-adopts the owner-operator inference but limits its ap-
plicability to civil proceedings.8
1. People v. Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 405, 126 N.E.2d 377, 382 (1955) (Fuld, J., dis-
senting).
2. See Part II infra.
3. 468 Pa. 618, 364 A.2d 687 (1976).
4. See Part III infra.
5. See Part IV infra.
6. See Part V, section A infra.
7. See Part V, section B infra.
8. See Part V, section C infra.
II. Owner-Operator Inferences
Effective enforcement of motor vehicle laws is often difficult be-
cause the prosecution is required to prove the identity of the operator
of the offending vehicle.9 Chase and capture situations are inher-
ently dangerous, and driver identification is especially difficult when
police do not witness the accident.'° Several jurisdictions, therefore,
have adopted an evidentiary device that enables a prosecutor to es-
tablish the identity element, to the extent necessary to make out a
prima facie case and avoid a defendant's motion for a directed ver-
dict, by a mere showing of the license number of the vehicle."I The
mechanism used is the inference or presumption 2 that the owner of
a motor vehicle was its operator at the specific time of the moving or
parking offense.' 3
In Pennsylvania, an owner-operator inference provision was
first enacted in 1919'4 and was later codified in the 1976 Vehicle
Code.' 5 The owner-operator inference section 16 provides that "the
9. Proof that the defendant was the operator in question is an essential element of a
traffic offense. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hicks, 203 Pa. Super. Ct. 307, 310, 201 A.2d 294,
296 (1964).
10. Furthermore, in cases in which police pursuit is possible, any attempt may be inhib-
ited by the surrounding circumstances, for example, the danger to bystanders imminent in a
high-speed chase through urban or suburban neighborhoods.
11. In addition to prosecutions involving moving violations, the so-called "chase and
capture" situation, evidentiary assistance is necessary in "wait and capture" parking cases, in
which it is obviously impractical to require a police officer to remain at the site of the parking
violation for minutes, hours, or even days awaiting the operator's return. See Commonwealth
v. Zaimes, 100 Dauph. 196, 198, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 612, 614-15 (C.P. 1978).
12. Commentators draw a precise distinction between the meaning of these two words.
See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.9 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JAMES], 9 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2487 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMOREJ. Nevertheless, courts and stat-
utory draftsmen sometimes employ these words indiscriminately, at least in the field of crimi-
nal law. See, e.g., Ulster County Court v. Allen, 99 S. Ct. 2213 (1979). It is generally settled
that the term "presumption" is properly used in the criminal law to describe what in legal
effect should be more correctly termed an "inference." See J. MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 342 (2d ed. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK], Jeffries & Stephan,
Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1335-36
(1979). See discussion at notes 30-34 and accompanying text infra.
13. The legislatures of several states have established such an inference. See, e.g., CAL.
VEH. CODE § 41102 (West Supp. 1979) (expressly limited to parking violations); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 14-107 (West Supp. 1979) (moving and parking violations). For cases examining
common-law inferences, see, e.g., People v. Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 126 N.E.2d 377 (1955)
(invalid for moving violations); People v. Rubin, 284 N.Y. 392, 31 N.E.2d 501 (1940) (valid for
parking violations). See generally Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 456 (1956) (inference or presumption
that owner of motor vehicle was its driver at time of traffic, driving, or parking offense).
14. Act of June 30, 1919, P.L. 678, No. 283, § 30.
15. New Motor Vehicle Code, Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, No. 81 (codified at 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6342 (Purdon 1977)).
16. Section 6342 provides as follows:
(a) General rule.-In any proceeding for a violation of the provisions of this title
or any local ordinance, rule or regulation, the registration plate displayed on a vehi-
cle shall be prima facie evidence that the owner of the vehicle was then operating the
vehicle.
(b) Burden shifted by testimony of owner.-If at any hearing or proceeding the
owner testifies under oath or affirmation that the owner was not operating the vehicle
at the time of the alleged violation and submits to an examination as to who at the
time was operating the vehicle and reveals the name of the person, if known, then the
registration plate displayed on a vehicle shall be prima facie evi-
dence that the owner of the vehicle was then operating the vehi-
cle."' 7 The inference established by section 6342 is overcome by
testimony of the owner denying that he operated the vehicle and re-
vealing the identity of the person, if known, who was the operator at
the time of the violation.' 8
Numerous cases reveal successful utilization of the inference in
prosecution of moving' 9 and parking20 violations. Prosecutorial fail-
ures occur when the defense rebuts the inference 2' or when the infer-
ence is improperly established by the state.2 2 Despite long-standing
acceptance of the owner-operator inference by the lower courts, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared section 6342 unconstitutional
in Commonwealth v. Slaybaugh.23 The questions raised in that deci-
sion 24 provoke an inquiry into the constitutional requirements of a
valid criminal inference.
III. Constitutional Issues Raised by the Use of Criminal
Inferences
A. Criminal Inferences in General
Both the judiciary25 and commentators 26 recognize that infer-
prima facie evidence arising from the registration plate shall be overcome and re-
moved and the burden of proof shifted.
(c) Burden shifted by affidavit of owner.-If the information is made in a county
other than that of the owner's own residence and an affidavit setting forth these facts
is forwarded to the issuing authority, the prima facie evidence arising from the regis-
tration plate shall be overcome and the burden of proof shifted.
Id
17. Id § 6342(a).
18. Id § 6342(b).
The question arises, at what point is testimony by the defense sufficient to rebut the infer-
ence as a matter of law and thereby sustain a motion for directed verdict. Clearly, a defendant
cannot automatically defeat the inference and the prima facie case by taking the stand, deny-
ing he was the operator, and denying any knowledge of the identity of the actual operator.
Otherwise, defendants, culpable or not, will always testify to general ignorance and render the
inference a nullity. Resolution takes place on a case-by-case basis. If the judge is satisfied
with defendant's testimony, for example, because it is uncontroverted, the inference is rebutted
and the prima facie case defeated. If the defendant's testimony is contradicted or unpersuasive
and raises a question of fact, the prima facie case remains intact and is submitted to the jury,
which considers the testimony and weighs the significance of the inference in the particular
case.
19. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 93 Montg. 95 (Pa. C.P. 1970), afdmem., 218 Pa.
Super. Ct. 780, 273 A.2d 524 (1971).
20. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lines, 32 Erie 168 (Pa. C.P. 1948).
21. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bolger, 19 Monroe II (Pa. C.P. 1957). Cf Common-
wealth v. Bursick, 170 Pa. Super. Ct. 375, 85 A.2d 608 (1952) (inference rebutted by the prose-
cution).
22. See Commonwealth v. Shupe, 17 Chest. I (Pa. C.P. 1968), affdmem., 214 Pa. Super.
Ct. 775, 253 A.2d 295 (1969) (no evidence that license plate was on the vehicle at the time of
accident).
23. 468 Pa. 618, 364 A.2d 687 (1976).
24. See Part IV infra.
25. "Inferences and presumptions are a staple of our adversarial system of factfinding."
Ulster County Court v. Allen, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 2224 (1979).
26. "Presumptions are aids to reasoning and argumentation. ... J. THAYER, A PRE-
LIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 314 (1898).
ences and presumptions are valuable evidentiary tools27 in crimi-
nal28 and civil29 proceedings. Although the terms "inference" and
"presumption" are frequently used interchangeably in the criminal
setting, the two are in fact clearly distinguishable.30 An inference is
essentially a permissible deduction from the evidence. 3' Since a pre-
sumption is a compulsory inference that the jury cannot disregard
unless rebutted,32 the term is properly used only in civil cases. Shift-
ing the burden of producing evidence onto a defendant in a criminal
case is constitutionally impermissible.33
In criminal law, inferences are employed to aid the prosecution
27. The rationale underlying the utilization of inferences and presumptions generally
includes a combination of the following three elements: (1) justification on the grounds of
human experience or probability; (2) comparative convenience in production of evidence be-
cause securing legally competent evidence is difficult or because one of the parties has peculiar
access to the evidence or peculiar knowledge of the facts; and (3) furtherance of a socially
desirable result. See Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV.
906, 906 (1931); Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 255, 257-59 (1937); THAYER, supra
note 26, at 314.
Early decisions recognized the second element, convenience in production of evidence, as
an independent standard by which to measure the validity of inferences in criminal cases. See
Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934). Later, however, the Court reduced conven-
ience to the status of a corollary, making the argument admissible only when the inference also
met the first element of probability or rationality. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 34
(1969); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943). Similarly, the furtherance of a result
deemed to be socially desirable is now also recognized as merely a corollary of the first control-
ling element, and not an independent standard. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at § 343.
28. See, e.g., Ulster County Court v. Allen, 99 S. Co. 2213 (1979) (majority and dissent-
ing opinions); Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1973); Tot v. United States, 319
U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
29. JAMES, supra note 12, at § 7.9; MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at § 343.
30. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at § 342; WIGMORE, supra note 12, at
§§ 2490-91.
31. An inference is a permissible deduction of the existence of a given fact that arises as a
reasonable probability from a proven fact. No rule of law or duty of rebuttal attaches to an
inference, and the jury may give it whatever weight it desires. WIGMORE, supra note 12, at
§ 2491.
32. A presumption is a rule of law laid down by the court, attaching to a proven fact a
burden to come forward and rebut the deduction. In the absence of adequate evidence to the
contrary, the jury is bound to accept the presumed fact. 1d. at § 2487. See also Cogdell v.
Wilmington & W.R. Co., 132 N.C. 852, 44 S.E. 618 (1903).
33. Due process rights are impinged by a presumption that casts upon a defendant the
burden of proving that the presumed fact does not exist. A state must prove every element of
an offense beyond a reasonable doubt and may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant
by means of a presumption. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977). See also Sand-
strom v. Montana, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
A true shifting of the burden of producing evidence to the defendant in a crimi-
nal case would mean that the court would be compelled to direct the jury to find
against him with regard to the presumed fact if he fails to introduce sufficient proof
on the issue. . . . [A] directed verdict or a peremptory ruling against the accused in a
criminal case . . . is abhorrent to the criminal law.
MCCORMICK, supra note 12: at § 342.
Therefore, although the term "presumption" is traditionally retained in the criminal law,
it actually describes and should be referred to as an "inference," which permits, but does not
require, the factfinder to accept the presumed fact, placing no burden of any kind on the
defendant.
in proving an element of an offense.34 Thus, proof of a fact that
raises an inference allows the prosecution to submit its case to the
jury and avoid a directed verdict for the defendant when it cannot
prove all the elements that constitute the prima facie case.35
B. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Pragmatically, an inference increases the risk that a defendant
who fails to produce conflicting evidence may suffer an adverse ver-
dict. Thus, in determining whether inferences violate the constitu-
tional protection against compulsory self-incrimination, one must
consider whether the defendant is, in effect, compelled to testify in
an attempt to rebut the inference.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that inferences do not
unconstitutionally impair the privilege against self-incrimination be-
cause they do not compel the defendant to take any action.36  The
defendant has a constitutional right not to take the witness stand,
and an inference can usually be satisfactorily rebutted by evidence
independent of the defendant's testimony.37 Nevertheless, to avoid
requiring a defendant to testify to rebut a prima facie case estab-
lished by the use of an inference, a legislature should afford alterna-
tive methods of explanation when drafting statutory inferences.38
34. Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 12, at 1338. Illustratively, the trier of fact might be
authorized to infer fact X, an element of the crime charged, from proof of act Y Id at 1336.
35. Id Because the inference makes submission of the case to the jury possible, it is often
termed prima facie evidence. See, e.g., the language of 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6342 (Pur-
don 1977), the owner-operator inference, at note 16 supra.
The term "prima facie," as employed by the judiciary, has two meanings. At times it is
used as equivalent to a presumption, imposing upon the opponent the duty of producing evi-
dence. See State v. Sattley, 131 Mo. 464, 33 S.W. 41 (1895) ("the prima facie case is sufficient
and conclusive, unless rebutted by the other evidence in the case"); Polhemus v. Prudential
Realty Corp., 74 N.J.L. 570, 67 A. 303 (1907) ("the prima facie evidence became decisive of the
issue"). This interpretation should be avoided in criminal cases. See note 33, supra. The term
may also be used to refer to the sufficiency of evidence necessary to go to the jury for consider-
ation. The latter use of the term "prima facie" is concerned with the initial duty of the prose-
cution to produce some evidence in order to avoid a directed verdict. See Crane v. Morris, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 598 (1832) ("Whenever evidence is offered to the jury which is in its nature prima
facie proof, . . . [w]hatever just influence it may derive from that character, the jury have [sic)
a right to give it . . . the law has submitted it to them to decide for themselves"); WIOMORE,
supra note 12, at § 2494. The term prima facie, when used in conjunction with criminal infer-
ences, is properly employed when it is given the second meaning. The drafters of the proposed
Federal Criminal Code adopted this meaning in § 103(5). See FINAL REPORT, NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS (1971). See also MCCORMICK, supra
note 12, at § 342 n.26.
36. See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973); Turner v. United States, 396
U.S. 398 (1970); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
37. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846-47 (1973). The introduction of any
evidence tending to implicate the defendant increases the pressure on the defendant to testify.
The Supreme Court has long recognized, however, that the pressure arises from the circum-
stances and the massing of evidence against the defendant, and not from a form of impermissi-
ble compulsion. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 417-18 (1970). Yee Hem v. United
States, 268 U.S. 178, 185 (1925).
38. Cf. People v. Hoogy, 277 Mich. 578, 269 N.W. 605 (1936) (city ordinance held uncon-
C Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Another constitutional requirement is that the factfinder must
be persuaded of all the essential elements of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt in order to convict the defendant.39 This substantial bur-
den is an essential feature of the due process guarantee.40
When an inference is used by the prosecution, the ultimate con-
stitutional requirement is that "the device must not undermine the
factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the
State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt."'" Al-
though confirming due process applicability, this broad language
does not specify how the factfinder is to satisfy the standard when an
element of the offense is proved through the use of an inference.42
The solution lies in an examination of the minimum standards under
which a criminal inference may be legitimately invoked.
D. Minimum Validity Requirements
When evaluating statutory criminal inferences, 43 due process
standards generally require some natural link between the proved
and presumed facts." This requirement is based on the judiciary's
stitutional because it provided no way to rebut the prima facie case other than for the defend-
ant to testify).
Overall, the cases indicate that the Court balances individual protections against society's
need for effective law enforcement. An underlying consideration, which may very well tilt the
balance against a finding of compulsion, is that criminal inferences usually operate in areas in
which the defendant has a unique knowledge of, or access to, the true facts. While not directly
adopting the principle, the modem Court has nevertheless embraced Justice Cardozo's intima-
tion in Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934), that it is "just" to go so far as to require an
explanation from the defendant when he has a better opportunity for knowledge, if the defend-
ant is not subjected to hardship or oppression. Id at 88-89. This view does not conflict with
the notion of presumption of innocence. The tenet is not an absolute; rather, it must be consid-
ered in light of other valid concerns. Moreover, since other principles, such as the requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, are also applied, there is no decline in the protection of
individual rights.
39. McCoRMICK, supra note 12, at § 341.
40. The due process clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
It has been suggested that the proof requirements embodied in Winship should be ad-
justed to reflect and parallel the sort of penalties contemplated--the less serious the punish-
ment authorized, the less the constitutional requirement of proof. See Jeffries & Stephan,
supra note 12, at 1365.
41. Ulster County Court v. Allen, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 2224 (1979).
42. In reference to the standard handed down in Ulster, that of finding the ultimate facts
beyond a reasonable doubt, the question raised is whether the state must show that the pre-
sumed fact follows from the proved fact beyond a reasonable doubt, or that a rational connec-
tion exists between the proved and presumed facts, in which case all the evidence on the record
can be used to satisfy the reasonable doubt standard for the element.
43. Although theoretically applicable to common-law and civil inferences, vigorous con-
stitutional attacks have been limited to statutory inferences, particularly in criminal cases. See
MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at § 344. But see Sandstrom v. Montana, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979)
(challenge to common-law criminal inference that a person intends the ordinary consequences
of his voluntary acts).
44. "[Wjhen the jury is encouraged to make factual inferences, those inferences must
reflect some valid general observation about the natural connection between events as they
realization that, even though it has only a permissive affect on the
factfinder, an inference may be sufficient to take an otherwise defi-
cient case to the jury.45
The Supreme Court first articulated a due process rule relating
to inferences in Tot v. United States.46 The Court adopted a "ra-
tional connection" test as the controlling legal standard for inference
validity. The test requires a "rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed, [a connection grounded in]
common experience."47 Subsequently,48 in Leary v. United States,4 9
the Court refined this due process requirement to include what later
came to be known as a "more-likely-than-not" test and proclaimed
that "a criminal statutory [inference] must be regarded as 'irrational'
or 'arbitrary,' and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be
said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely
than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to de-
pend."50
In Barnes v. United States,5 the Court was urged, unsuccess-
fully, to reach the question of whether a valid inference under the
Tot-Leary criteria must also satisfy the criminal "reasonable doubt
standard"52 when proof of an essential element of the crime charged
occur in our society." Ulster County Court v. Allen, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 2231 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
See generally 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1356 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).
45. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at § 344.
46. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
47. 1d at 467-68. In Tot, a federal statute made possession of a firearm by a person
convicted of a crime of violence inferential evidence of illegal interstate receipt. The Court
found an insufficient rational connection between firearm possession and interstate reception.
48. In the interim, the analysis of Tot was used by the Court in two noteworthy cases
involving illegal distillers, United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965), and United States v.
Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965). In Gainey, a statute authorized the jury to infer from defend-
ant's unexplained presence at an illegal still that he was "carrying on" the business of a distiller
without having filed bond as required by law. Relying on Tot, the Court upheld the inference
based on the comprehensive nature of the offense and the common knowledge that illegal stills
are secret operations. Nevertheless, in Romano, the Court declared that presence at an illegal
still could not support the narrower inference that the defendant had possession, custody, or
control of the still. The Court viewed the connection between presence and possession as too
tenuous to support the inference.
The antipodal results in these very similar cases cannot be satisfactorily explained by
mere reference to the comprehensive nature of the statutory language. Such a distinction is
arbitrary and untenable. In fact, the obfuscated findings were not intelligible until the Court's
recent explanation of the Gainey and Romano holdings in Ulster County Court v. Allen, 99 S.
Ct. 2213 (1979). See note 60 infra.
49. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
50. Id at 36. In Leary, a statute authorized the jury to infer knowledge of illegal impor-
tation from the fact of defendant's unexplained possession of marijuana. The Court noted the
existence of a significant possibility that any given marijuana was domestically grown and the
improbability that a user would be aware of either domestic or foreign origin. As a result, the
Court determined that knowledge of importation is not likely to flow from proof of possession
and ruled the inference invalid.
51. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
52. The Court avoided consideration of this issue in Leary. Because the inference failed
to pass the easier more-likely-then-not test, a fortiori, it failed the stricter test of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. at 36 n.64.
depended upon use of the inference.53 Such a standard would re-
quire "the evidence necessary to invoke the inference [to be] suffi-
cient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a
reasonable doubt."54 Since the inference in question met both the
more-likely-than-not and reasonable doubt tests,55 the Court found
it unnecessary to choose between them and embraced the pair.56
Only recently, in Ulster County Court v. Allen, 57 did the Court
isolate the necessary factor for determining whether a reasonable
doubt or more-likely-than-not standard should apply. The Court
noted that inferences can be categorized as either permissive, judged
by the less strict more-likely-than-not standard, 58 or mandatory,
judged by the strict reasonable doubt test.59  The Court held that
instructions to the jury usually control the type of inference utilized
and, thus, the level of scrutiny focused on the validity of the infer-
ence.6" Therefore, if the judge clearly instructs that the inference is
53. In Barnes, the unexplained possession of Treasury checks recently stolen from the
mails permitted the jury to draw the inference that the possessor knew the checks were stolen.
Knowledge is an element of the federal crime of theft or receipt of material stolen from the
mail. 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1976).
54. 412 U.S. at 843.
55. The inference was well founded in history, common sense, and experience, and,
therefore, was clearly sufficient to enable the jury to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable
doubt. A fortiori, the inferred fact flowed more-likely-than-not from the proven fact. Id at
845-46.
56. Acknowledging that the standards bore ambiguous relations to one another, the
Court attributed the ambiguity "to variations in language and focus rather than to differences
of substance." Id at 843. Nonetheless, there is a great difference between the levels of proof
required by the tests. Although an inferred fact that flows beyond a reasonable doubt natu-
rally passes the more-likely-than-not test, the inverse does not necessarily follow. The Court
failed to clarify the circumstances in which each test is applied, leaving state and federal courts
without authoritative guidance in the matter for six years.
57. 99 S. Ct. 2213 (1979). A New York statute provided that the presence of a firearm in
an automobile permitted the inference of illegal possession by all persons then occupying the
vehicle. The inference was ruled valid and the conviction upheld.
58. The permissive inference is "only a circumstance to be considered along with all the
other circumstances in the case." Id. at 2225 n. 16. "As long as it is clear [in the judge's charge
to the jury] that the [inference] is not the sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt, it need
only satisfy the test described in Leary. Id at 2230. Thus, it must be made clear to the jury
that it must also accept other evidence tending to prove the essential fact if it is to find an
inferred element beyond a reasonable doubt. Merely finding that the fact from which a ra-
tional inference arises is true, is not, in itself, enough to prove an element beyond a reasonable
doubt. Upon review, the record as a whole must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to deter-
mine if the requisite degree of guilt was established. Id at 2227, 2230.
59. The label "mandatory" is a misnomer, because it implies something obligatory. As
used by the Court, however, an inference is mandatory if it alone is deemed sufficient evidence
to authorize conviction, even if the jury disbelieved all additional evidence of guilt. Id at 2225
n. 16. "[Slince the prosecution bears the burden of establishing guilt, it may not rest its case
entirely on an inference unless the fact proved is sufficient to support the inference of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id at 2229. The validity of a mandatory inference is, therefore,
evaluated while divorced from the specific facts of the case. The test is the accuracy of the
inference in the run of cases, or "on its face." Id at 2225-26.
60. To illustrate this new theory, the Court reexamined the Gainey and Romano distiller
cases. See note 48 supra. The Court implied that the difference in the outcome in those cases
was mainly attributable to the difference between the jury instructions. The Gainey inference
is permissive because the instruction makes it clear that there is no requirement to convict even
if the jury is convinced of the defendant's presence at the still. Scrutiny of the inference was at
merely to be considered in conjunction with all the evidence submit-
ted, the inference is analyzed by the more-likely-than-not standard.
The prosecution must then rely on the evidence in the entire record
to meet the requirement of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.6' If the
evidence that supports the finding of an element essential to the
prosecution's case is based on only a rational inference, a conviction
will be reversed.62
IV. The Pennsylvania Owner-Operator Inference
A. The Slaybaugh Decision
In Commonwealth v. Slaybaugh63 the defendant was charged
with failing to stop at the scene of an accident.64 At trial, the prose-
cution relied on Pennsylvania's statutory owner-operator inference
65
to establish that Slaybaugh was operating the vehicle at the time of
the incident.66 The judge, sitting as factfinder, chose to disregard
Slaybaugh's exculpatory testimony67 and found him guilty. The trial
the more-likely-than-not rationality level. All of the circumstances in the case resulted in a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the Romano inference was mandatory,
because the instruction stated that presence alone would support conviction, regardless of the
other evidence. Since the inference alone justified a guilty verdict, the inference had to support
such a finding beyond a reasonable doubt "on its face," regardless of the specific circumstances
in the case. The inference failed the stricter test, and the conviction was reversed. 99 S. Ct. at
2225 n. 16.
The Court also reviewed its Leary decision. See notes 49-50 supra. The Court labelled
the inference "mandatory" because the jury instructions indicated that the inference alone
authorized conviction. The strict standard was therefore applied and the conviction reversed
because the inference failed to pass the facial beyond a reasonable doubt test. 99 S. Ct. at 2225
n.17.
61. 99 S. Ct. at 2229.
62. Arguably, the Court's language indicates a lessening of the requirement that every
element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See note 40 supra. Instead, inference
cases would be required to satisfy the proof requirement based on the evidence in 1oto. Other-
wise, a more-likely-than-not inference, when it is the only evidence introduced to prove an
element of the crime charged, escapes a directed verdict only to fall to a judgment n.o.v, be-
cause it fails to prove the element beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, in Sandstrom v.
Montana, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979), decided fourteen days after Ulster, the Court reaffirmed that
the "every element" proof requirement survives in inference cases. In effect, in cases that rely
on a minimum, more-likely-than-not inference to reach the jury, the prosecution must present
other evidence to substantiate the inference if the element is to be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
63. 16 Adams 142 (Pa. C.P. 1974), af'd, 468 Pa. 618, 364 A.2d 687 (1976).
64. The automobile of the victim, Harry Lambert, was struck as he and a passenger pre-
pared to turn into a private driveway. Lambert recorded the license number of the vehicle and
reported the incident to the police. Subsequently, David Slaybaugh, the owner of the vehicle
displaying the recorded license plate number, was arrested and charged with a hit-and-run
offense, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1027 (current version 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3742-45
(Purdon 1977)). 16 Adams at 143.
65. The pertinent statute in effect at the time was PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1212 (current
version 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6342 (Purdon 1977)). The language was substantially the
same as subsequent § 6342. See note 16 supra.
66. The prosecution's direct evidence was limited to the victim's description of the acci-
dent and license number and certification by the Bureau of Motor Vehicles that the vehicle
bearing the recorded license belonged to Slaybaugh. 16 Adams at 143.
67. Slaybaugh testified that he was not driving at or near the time of the accident; that he
did not know who was driving; and that as many as fifteen persons had access to his automo-
court subsequently granted defendant's motion in arrest of judgment
and discharged him.68 On appeal,69 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed 7" and held the statutory owner-operator inference
unconstitutional.
71
The court launched a dual attack on the Pennsylvania law.
First, the court concluded that the statute contained an impermissi-
ble criminal presumption. This conclusion was based upon the
court's determination that the statute shifted the burden of proof to
the defendant, requiring binding instructions unless the defendant
agreed to testify.72 Second, the court decided that even if the statute
was construed as creating an inference, the relationship between an
owner and operator is insufficient to satisfy the required standard of
proof. The court held that an inference used to establish an essential
element of a crime must meet the reasonable doubt standard73 and
declared that the inferred fact of vehicle operation did not logically
follow, beyond a reasonable doubt, from mere ownership.74
Examination of the requirements relating to the validity of in-
ferences clearly reveals that the reasoning of the court in Slaybaugh
bile. On rebuttal, the investigating officer contradicted Slaybaugh's testimony by stating that
Slaybaugh had previously told the officer that he had been "riding around" prior to the acci-
dent. Id at 143-44. Because Slaybaugh's testimony was contradicted, creating a question of
fact to be resolved by the fact finder, in this case the judge, the inference was not overcome as a
matter of law. See note 18 supra.
68. The court ruled that the owner-operator provision was unconstitutional for two rea-
sons. First, the court found the connection between ownership and operation unreasonable.
16 Adams at 146. Second, the court determined that the statute shifted the burden of proof
from the Commonwealth to the defendant. Id at 147.
69. Appeal by the Commonwealth of a post-guilty verdict legal ruling is permissible if
the appeal does not subject the defendant to a second trial or additional punishments. United
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
70. The Commonwealth appealed to the superior court, who certified the record to the
supreme court for disposition. 468 Pa. at 621, 364 A.2d at 689.
71. Id at 622, 364 A.2d at 689.
72. Id at 623-24, 364 A.2d at 689-90. The court stated that the statutory language cre-
ated a directed verdict statute, violating the following constitutional precepts: that all men are
innocent until proven guilty; that criminal defendants shall not be compelled to testify; and
that the prosecution must prove every element of the crime charged. Id. at 624, 364 A.2d at
690.
73. The devastating impact of such a requirement for all elemental inferences is readily
apparent. The rule restricts the use of all inferences except those of such certainty as to rob the
device of any practical consequence, thus eliminating it as a meaningful feature in the criminal
law. See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 12, at 1337. Such a rule would restrict acceptable
inferences to those of a scientific nature, such as the chemical blood-alcohol inference.
74. 468 Pa. at 625, 634 A.2d at 690. Section 6342 was a factor in two later decisions. In
one, a conviction was reversed on the basis of Slaybaugh. See Commonwealth v. Leaman, 255
Pa. Super. Ct. 481, 388 A.2d 330 (1978) (defendant observed by the police while drag racing).
In the other, five summary convictions for parking violations were upheld. The court dis-
tinguished Slaybaugh, holding that it is inapplicable to non-moving violations. Common-
wealth v. Zaimes, 100 Dauph. 196, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 612 (C.P. 1978). It is questionable whether
an owner-operator inference should be granted any greater validity in parking offenses than in
moving violation cases. Certainly, enforcement in parking cases would be all but impossible if
an eyewitness identification of the parking violator was required. Id at 198, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d
at 614-15.
Ultimately, section 6342 was repealed. Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202, No. 53, § 13(34).
conflicts with contemporary constitutional principles. Penn-
sylvania's provision should be treated as creating an inference; the
statute certainly does not create a burden-shifting presumption.75
The legislative intent to create an inference is indicated by the legis-
lature's phrasing of the statute in the guise of prima facie evidence.
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In addition, although the drafters were imprecise when stating that
the burden of proof shifted back to the prosecution if the defendant
testified, the effect of the language is absolutely nonprejudicial to the
defendant; it merely refers to the prima facie requirements that the
prosecution must meet in order to avoid a directed verdict for the
defendant.77 Because an ambiguously worded statute may cause the
jury to misunderstand the impact of an inference, it is critical that
the jury instructions explicitly indicate the true weight to be afforded
an inference.78 Even a judge in a bench trial may err in determining
the value an inference is to be given. An error in improper applica-
tion of an inference, however, should not be decided as a constitu-
tional challenge to the statute itself. If the statutory inference can
pass a more-likely-than-not test, it withstands constitutional attack.
The record must then be evaluated to determine whether all the sur-
rounding circumstances support the finding beyond a reasonable
doubt.7 9 While the "not guilty" result in Slaybaugh may be correct
because of insufficient evidence to substantiate the inference,8 ° the
ruling on the constitutional question is unfounded. In order to de-
termine whether the owner-operator inference meets minimum due
75. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court highlighted this fact in Commonwealth v.
DiFrancesco, 458 Pa. 188, 329 A.2d 204 (1974), stressing that "virtually all so-called 'criminal
presumptions' are really no more than permissible inferences." Id at 193 n.3, 329 A.2d at 208
n.3.
76. See note 35 supra. Describing an inference as "prima facie evidence" may well be the
most unoffensive manner for avoiding misinterpretation. Several federal statutes employ
much stronger language. In Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), the inference was
phrased in terms of "presumptive evidence." In Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), the
wording used was "sufficient evidence to authorize conviction."
77. The court erred by determining that the failure of the defendant to testify compels a
finding that he was, in fact, the operator of the vehicle. Instead, the statutory references to
defendant's testimony and to reallocation of the burden of proof operate narrowly at the prima
facie case level. If the defendant testifies, the resultant shift in the burden means that the
inference has been removed, there is no longer a prima facie case, and the defendant is dis-
charged unless the prosecution can otherwise prove he was the operator. If the defendant fails
to testify, his silence merely permits the prosecution's case to reach the factfinder, and the
inference remains as evidence to be considered by the jury, but does not mandate any finding.
In addition to general inference principles, judicial language in an earlier owner-operator in-
ference case supports such an interpretation. Commonwealth v. Bolger, 182 Pa. Super. Ct.
309, 126 A.2d 536 (1956).
78. See notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra. Pennsylvania courts implicitly recog-
nized the determinative nature ofjury instructions in cases applying inferences even before the
Supreme Court pronouncement in Ulster. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gearhart, 253 Pa.
Super. Ct. 238, 384 A.2d 1321 (1978) (prosecution for driving while under the influence of
alcohol). In Gearhart, the instructions gave improper weight to the blood-alcohol test that
raises the inference of intoxication.
79. See note 58 supra.
80. See note 66 supra.
process requirements, the statute must be evaluated by the rational
connection or more-likely-than-not standard.
B. The Validity of the Inference
Unfortunately, in Slaybaugh only the trial court examined the
due process rationality of the statute. The trial judge asserted that
modem society's automobile use patterns make unreasonable any
connection between ownership and operation.8 There are certainly
many individuals operating vehicles that they do not own. The basic
requirement of rationality, however, is that common experience sup-
port theprobability, and not the certainty, of the connection.82 Prior
judicial recognition of the rationality of owner-operator inferences83
should still be respected today. A comparison of the number of is-
sued operator licenses with the number of vehicle registrations sup-
ports the continued validity of those earlier decisions on
rationality.84
The Slaybaugh court, lacking empirical data upon which to
base its decision, erred by not deferring to the judgment of the legis-
lature, especially since the judgment was not clearly unfounded or
irrational. Such action would be more consistent with the general
rule that because the legislature is likely to have a sounder basis in
knowledge of pertinent facts, its judgments deserve great respect in
judicial assessment of the constitutionality of evidentiary infer-
81.
In these days of two and three car families, tax and personal liability consequences by
virtue of the ownership of an automobile, seemingly carefree lending of the use of
one's vehicle to friends, relatives, neighbors and business associates and the rising
number of car thefts, such a "connection" is no longer reasonable.
Commonwealth v. Slaybaugh, 16 Adams 142, 146 (Pa. C.P. 1974).
82. See State v. DeBiaso, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 297, _, 271 A.2d 857, 859 (1970); People v.
Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 405, 126 N.E.2d 377, 381, (1955) (Fuld, J., dissenting).
83. See State v. Knudsen, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 458, _, 217 A.2d 236, 238 (1965) (natural
inference based on common experience that as a general rule the owner of a car drives his own
vehicle); State v. Schonrog, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 239, _, 197 A.2d 546, 549 (1963) ("There is such a
strong rational connection between the registration number and the fact to be presumed, [oper-
ation]"); Commonwealth v. Foulke, 50 Montg. 276, 281, 22 Pa. D. & C. 135, 138 (C.P. 1934)
("common experience that as a general rule the owner of a car drives his own vehicle"). Con-
tra, People v. Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 401, 126 N.E.2d 377, 379 (1955) ("many a passenger
car is customarily driven at various times by various persons. . . many a person owns more
than one passenger automobile. . . some owners are not licensed operators, and. . . there are
outstanding in this [New York] State at least one million more automobile operators' licenses
than passenger automobile registrations"). Interestingly, the court did not indicate the total
number of licenses; if there were ten million licenses, the correlation would be 90%.
84. In Pennsylvania, the latest available statistics indicate a 64% correlation between ve-
hicle registrations (5.2 million) and operator licenses (8.1 million). (Figures supplied by the
Pa. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (September, 1979)). Although the correlation must be slightly
reduced to account for registered owners who do not also have operators' licenses, the data
nevertheless indicates a strong rational connection, based on probability, between operation
and ownership.
Unfortunately, no empirical data is available on the more fundamental statistics, the
number of vehicles on the highway actually operated by the owner at any given time. See
State v. Knudsen, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 458, _, 217 A.2d 236, 238 (1965). Only such a study of
general driving patterns can categorically verify the accuracy and rationality of the inference.
ences. 8- Pennsylvania courts have followed this policy when dealing
with other inferences,86 and other states adopt this approach when
considering owner-operator inferences.87
C The Viability of the Inference
Although the owner-operator inference survives the more-
likely-than-not rationality evaluation, it fails the beyond a reason-
able doubt standard. 88  Employment of the inference in a manner
that comports with due process requirements does not render it use-
less from a prosecutorial standpoint. The inference is viable, and its
use under proper guidelines strikes a balance between individual due
process guarantees and societal needs for adequate law enforcement.
When the only established evidence of vehicle operation in a case is
the license number, the prosecution will never be successful. The
case will be submitted to the jury because the inference satisfies
prima facie requirements, but the entire record obviously cannot
support a finding of identity beyond a reasonable doubt. Success in
prosecutions utilizing the owner-operator inference, therefore, re-
quires investigative police work to obtain some additional circum-
stantial evidence of operation.89 Justice is not frustrated, however, if
the only factual element lacking in proof of the offense is actual
identification of the operator at the time of the incident.90 Courts
85. See, e.g., Ulster County Court v. Allen, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 2229 n.27 (1979); Leary v.
United States, 395 U.S. 6, 39 (1969); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965).
In addition, the longevity of a statute itself forcefully supports a strong presumption of
constitutionality. See Commonwealth v. Giacco, 202 Pa. Super. Ct. 294, 302, 196 A.2d 189,
193 (1963), af'd, 415 Pa. 139, 202 A.2d 55 (1964). Although motor vehicle use has changed
drastically since the time the owner-operator inference was adopted, the value of the original
legislative judgment has not been diminished. The legislature had several opportunities to
review the applicability of the inference during statutory reorganizations, most recently in
1976, and declined the opportunity to replace the section.
86. Eg., Commonwealth v. DiFrancesco, 458 Pa. 188, 329 A.2d 204 (1974) (blood-alco-
hol inference of intoxication).
87. See State v. DeBiaso, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 297, 271 A.2d 857 (1970). Cf People v.
Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 126 N.E.2d 377 (1955) (reasons for a ruling adverse to the infer-
ence include the absence of legislative action).
88. See note 84 supra. Although the statistics document a rational connection between
ownership and operation, the 64% correlation clearly indicates that the inference does not
logically flow beyond a reasonable doubt.
89. Examples of circumstantial evidence include the opportunity to operate the vehicle at
the time of the offense or sole possession of the keys to the ignition. Success requires the same
type of investigative police work that takes place in prosecutions for other offenses.
90. The balance in the use of owner-operator inferences is amply illustrated by compar-
ing two Massachusetts cases that concluded with opposite results. In Commonwealth v. Shea,
324 Mass. 710, 88 N.E.2d 645 (1949), the prosecution failed to introduce any evidence that
identified the defendant as the operator of a vehicle involved in an accident and relied solely
on the inference. The court reversed the conviction, holding that "careful examination of the
record discloses nothing more than speculation, conjecture or surmise upon which [a guilty
verdict] could be based. This is insufficient to sustain the burden resting upon the Common-
wealth." 1d. at 714, 88 N.E.2d at 647.
In contrast, in Commonwealth v. Rand, 363 Mass. 554, 296 N.E.2d 200 (1973), the prose-
cution produced circumstantial evidence that the defendant had an opportunity to operate the
vehicle at the time of the hit-and-run accident, that he had not authorized anyone else to use
can realistically establish a fair balance and thus effectuate a desira-
ble social policy without causing the law to be unduly harsh to de-
fendants.
Pennsylvania could adopt this approach by reenacting a crimi-
nal owner-operator inference. The provision should contain precise,
unambiguous language to ensure that the permissive nature of the
inference is readily apparent. Legislative findings should incorpo-
rate any available empirical data that correlate ownership and oper-
ation to establish the validity of the inference for future
constitutional challenges. In addition, various legislative alternatives
should be considered when analyzing possible solutions for the evi-
dentiary void created in the wake of Slaybaugh.
V. Alternatives
A. Driver Identfication Statute
The law enforcement difficulties that necessitated the owner-op-
erator inference center on the frequent lack of positive identification
of the vehicle's operator at the time of an offense. Because an owner
of a registered vehicle should know or have access to information
concerning the identity of the driver, one approach is to adopt legis-
lation imposing criminal liability upon vehicle owners who fail to
reveal the identity of the operator, if known, when the vehicle is sus-
pected of being involved in a traffic violation or accident.9 A statute
of this type is immune from an attack grounded upon the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination.92
In California v. Byers93 the Supreme Court held that so-called
"hit-and-run" statutes, which require the operator of a motor vehicle
involved in an accident to stop and give his name and address, do
not violate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.94
The Court based its decision in Byers on four conclusions. First, the
Court found the statute to be essentially regulatory rather than crim-
inal in nature. The purpose of the statute is to implement state po-
lice power over highway safety and aid recovery in civil accident
claims, rather than to facilitate criminal convictions.95 Second, the
the car, and that he had sole possession of the keys to the ignition. The court affirmed the
conviction, holding that a review of the record disclosed that "the jury were [sic] warranted in
finding that the defendant was the operator of the automobile at the time of the accident." Id.
at 557, 296 N.E.2d at 205.
91. A similar proposal has been introduced in the Pennsylvania House as Pa. H. No.
1241, Printer's No. 1400, Session of 1979. The bill, however, remains in the Transportation
Committee to which it was referred on February 5, 1979.
92. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
93. 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (plurality opinion).
94. Five members of the Court, although not agreeing on the rationale, agreed on this
basic holding. Subsequently, in Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976), a majority of the
Court seemed to embrace the Byers plurality view. Id. at 662 n.16.
95. 402 U.S. at 430, 432-33.
required disclosure of the driver's name and address is an essentially
neutral act. Whatever the collateral consequences of that disclosure,
a name by itself does not implicate anyone in criminal conduct.
96
Third, self-reporting is indispensable to the fulfillment of the stat-
ute's regulatory purpose.97 Last, because driving an automobile is a
lawful activity, and accidents do not necessarily involve a criminal
offense, the burden of disclosure is directed at the public at large
rather than a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal
activities. Therefore, the risk of self-incrimination is not substan-
tial.98 The Court was apparently willing to overlook the practical
criminal consequences of the disclosure requirement in view of the
adverse impact on law enforcement if all stop-and-report statutes
were invalidated. 99
Because the same societal need for operator disclosure exists in
situations factually similar to Slaybaugh, courts should be willing to
overlook the criminal implications of driver identification statutes,
provided that they match the four criteria set forth in Byers. The
driver identification proposal has a clear regulatory purpose, and in
an accident situation, the Byers rationale is perfectly applicable. The
proposal promotes the satisfaction of civil claims among private par-
ties and assists in valid state, noncriminal activities such as "the
study of causes of vehicle accidents." The connection between the
proposal and its regulatory purpose is more difficult to support in
non-accident situations when only a traffic violation is involved. In
these cases, state police power to promote safety upon the highway is
the only noncriminal justification. Traffic violations such as speed-
ing create safety hazards. To that extent, identification of unsafe
drivers is necessary to effectively promote highway safety by punish-
ing offenders. Alternatively, as suggested in Byers, the state may de-
sire to undertake a study, for legitimate regulatory purposes, in
which the identity of the operator is critical."°'
The second Byers criterion limits any valid reporting require-
96. Id at 432, 434.
97. Id at 431.
98. Id
99. The plurality noted that hit-and-run statutes are in effect in all fifty states and the
District of Columbia. Id at 425.
For critical analysis of the decision, see Note, California v. Byers- Hit-and-Run Statutes
and the Privilege Against Se/f-Incrimination, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 728 (1972).
100. 402 U.S. at 430, 433. The plurality opinion implies that potentially self-incriminating
answers may be compelled because of the need for general studies on causation. Taken to the
extreme, the position can be used to justify the forced admission of any criminal offense under
the guise of a study of the "causes" of crime. Since there are valid regulatory purposes con-
nected with accidents, especially the identification of unskilled drivers, using the need for stud-
ies as an example is a poor choice.
101. For example, when deciding whether to raise the minimum driving age, a thorough
study surveying safety violators by age group is clearly dependent upon operator identity.
Generally, regulatory justification for the proposal can be discovered, although the underlying
purpose may be criminally related.
ment to the disclosure of name and address. This neutral act pro-
vides the missing element in any subsequent criminal prosecution.
In effect, it is the true advantage of the driver identification proposal.
Nevertheless, mere identity disclosure is not considered testimonial
evidence worthy of fifth amendment protection, even though it fur-
nishes a "link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute," since it
is only a collateral consequence of a neutral regulatory inquiry.
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The third finding made by the Court in Byers, the characteriza-
tion of the statute as an indispensable method, is derived from the
general principle that legitimate regulatory goals cannot be pursued
by means that stifle liberty if the goals can be otherwise more reason-
ably achieved.0 3 Identity disclosure is arguably the only reasonable
means of achieving the regulatory goals of highway safety and civil
suit settlement.
The last criterion presents the most difficult constitutional prob-
lem. In an accident situation, in which criminal liability is not neces-
sarily involved, the Byers determination that the statute is directed at
the automobile public at large, and not at a highly selective group, '04
generally validates identity disclosure. In contrast, the non-accident
traffic violation situation invariably concerns a group inherently sus-
pect of criminal activity; the very description of the class as traffic
violators makes them definitionally suspect.'0 5 Moreover, any at-
tempt to enlarge the group to avoid the impermissible focus faces the
challenge of being an overly broad means of achieving regulatory
goals. Inevitably, the validity of the proposal is dependent on liberal
court interpretation and scrutiny. To the extent that disclosure of
mere identity can be distinguished from disclosure of participation
in an illegal activity, the validity of the statute can be defended. 06
In addition, courts may interpret traffic offenses as essentially regula-
102. Id at 431-34. The Court analogized to the requirement of filing income tax returns.
A name, linked with a vehicle, is no more incriminating than a tax return, linked with the
disclosure of income. Alone, it identifies, but does not implicate. Id at 433-34.
Note that the holding applies only to the disclosure of identity. The privilege against self-
incrimination may be claimed appropriately against any other questions that are asked, Gar-
ner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 662 n.16 (1976), but in practice, a name and address is all
that is really needed to fulfill the true purpose of the proposal.
In the situation in which the husband is the owner and the wife the driver, although the
husband can be compelled to identify his wife as the operator, he cannot be required to testify
to that fact in a criminal proceeding. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5913 (Purdon 1978). Never-
theless, the disclosed information is certainly helpful in narrowing a police investigation, and
admissible evidence is more easily obtained when the focus is on the known operator.
103. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sterlace, 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 62, 354 A.2d 27 (1976).
104. 402 U.S. at 430-31.
105. A leading case in the area is Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), in which
gamblers as a class were considered by the Court to be a highly selective group inherently
suspect of criminal activities. Because of the substantial risk to self-incrimination, disclosures
in federal gambling tax and registration requirements were subject to the fifth amendment
privilege.
106. Theoretically, a suspected criminal's disclosure of his name is different, for example,
than the criminal's disclosure that he participates in illegal gambling. To truly parallel the
tory violations, even though criminal liability may attach.'0 7
Nevertheless, even if identity disclosure in traffic violation situa-
tions is invalidated, the proposal will be a success from a public in-
terest standpoint if driver identification is upheld in accident
situations. At least when personal injury or property damage to a
third party occurs, the needs of law enforcement and the demands of
justice are facilitated. In simple traffic violation situations, no one is
directly or immediately harmed. Thus, the impact on society is not
as significant.1
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The critical step is to persuade the courts that a driver identifi-
cation statute employs an essentially regulatory purpose. Once
courts accept that proposition, the proposal falls within the general
constitutional limitations on the exercise of the police power, that it
"must not be unreasonable, unduly oppressive or patently beyond
the necessities of the case, and the means which it employs must
have a real and substantial relation to the objects sought to be at-
tained." 09
B. Implied Consent Statute
A second proposal designed to assist law enforcement officials
in the identification of vehicle operators utilizes the theory and pro-
cedure of implied consent sobriety test statutes. I Implied consent
sobriety test statutes operate on the premise that by obtaining a li-
cense, the operator impliedly consents to permit a chemical test of
his breath, blood, or urine to determine the alcohol content of his
blood. A driver who refuses to submit to the sobriety test is subject
to a summary suspension of his operator's license."' In a similar
proposal, 12 the registered owner is deemed to have agreed to reveal
the driver's identity if the vehicle is suspected of being connected
Marchetti scheme, a statute would have to require all motorists to report the violation of any
traffic laws. The types of disclosure are reasonably distinguishable.
107. The Byers plurality noted, for example, that although the California Vehicle Code
defines some criminal offenses, the statute is essentially regulatory, not criminal. 402 U.S. at
430.
108. From a sociological viewpoint, the driver identification statute may be criticized for
its effects on the family and its impairment of the full enjoyment of personal property. How-
ever, any disruption of family life by requiring parent-owners to identify their offspring as the
operators is outweighed by the public interest in safety on the highway. This same concern for
public safety justifies the state's limitation on the owner's right to indiscriminately lend his
motor vehicle to others without some attached responsibility for its safe operation.
109. Gambone v. Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 551, 101 A.2d 634, 637 (1954).
110. Pennsylvania's sobriety test statute is codified at 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547
(Purdon 1977).
11I. See generally Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1064 (1963); Comment, The Pennsylvania Implied
Consent Law- Problems Arising in a Criminal Proceeding, 74 DICK. L. REV. 219 (1970).
112. An implied consent driver identification proposal was introduced in the Pennsylvania
General Assembly in 1977 as part of a bill making onmibus changes in the Vehicle Code. Pa.
H. No. 1171, Printer's No. 3904, Session of 1977. The implied consent section passed both the
House and Senate by wide margins. Nonetheless, the section did not become law because
with an accident or traffic violation." t3 Despite the similarity be-
tween these two implied consent statutes, the arguments that support
the constitutional validity of the sobriety statute are not clearly ap-
plicable to the driver identification proposal. Criticism of the latter
is derived from the constitutional principle that a person cannot be
held to have waived his privilege against self-incrimination by mere
implication.'
In implied consent sobriety statutes, the operator's consent to
chemical testing is the condition attached to obtaining a driver's li-
cense. This consent does not include a waiver of any rights because
these chemical tests do not violate the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation."' The privilege against self-incrimination bars only the
compulsion of "communications" or "testimony." It does not pro-
hibit compelling a witness to be the source of "real or physical evi-
dence."" 16 Since the taking of a chemical test can be categorized as
nontestimonial or physical, no waiver is involved." 7
An identification implied consent proposal, however, presumes
testimonial evidence, the naming of the operator of the vehicle.
Therefore, a court challenge will yield one of two possible outcomes.
conference committee disagreement on an unrelated studded tire provision led to the defeat of
the entire bill.
The implied consent proposal has been reintroduced in the current legislative session as
part of Pa. H. No. 425, Printer's No. 456, Session of 1979, § 1552.
113. In pertinent part, section 1552 of Pa. H. No. 425, id., provides:
§ 1552. Identification of driver.
(a) Agreement to reveal identity of driver.-Any person to whom a motor vehi-
cle is titled or registered in this Commonwealth is deemed to have agreed:
(1) To reveal the identity of the driver of the vehicle, if known, to any police
officer who shall have reasonable grounds to believe the vehicle was involved in an
accident or any violation of the law.
(b) Suspension for refusal.-
(1) If any person to whom a motor vehicle is titled or registered in this Common-
wealth shall refuse to reveal the identity of the driver of the vehicle as provided in
subsection (a)(1), the department shall:
(i) suspend the registration of the operating privilege of the person for a
period of six months; or
(ii) suspend the registration of the vehicle or the operating privilege of the
person for a period of one year for a second or subsequent refusal within a pe-
riod of three years.
Id
114. See note 121 infra.
115. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
116. Id at 764. "[The privilege] offers no protection against compulsion to submit to
fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification'[handwrit-
ing or voiceprints], to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a
particular gesture." Id
117. Petitioner's testimonial capacities were in no way implicated [in the chemical
test]; indeed, his participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the
test, which depends on chemical analysis and on that alone. Since the blood test
evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither petitioner's
testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the peti-
tioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds.
Id at 765. Accord, Commonwealth v. Funk, 254 Pa. Super. Ct. 233, 385 A.2d 995 (1978);
Commonwealth v. Statti, 166 Pa. Super. Ct. 577, 73 A.2d 688 (1950).
First, courts may apply the rationale enunciated in California v. By-
ers and view the disclosure of name and address as a neutral "utter-
ance," one not of a "testimonial" nature in the sense of the fifth
amendment." 8 If the courts reach that conclusion, and the other By-
ers criteria are established," 9 the implied consent proposal should
survive a constitutional challenge on the basis that it is essentially
regulatory in nature. 2 °
Courts may rule, however, that requiring the owner to identify
the operator compels "testimonial" evidence in violation of fifth
amendment guarantees. Since the state may not condition the issu-
ance of licenses upon a waiver or surrender of constitutional protec-
tions,' 2' the owner would be able to freely exercise his right to refuse
to testify. 1
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The validity of both the implied consent and driver identifica-
tion proposals hinges on whether the statutes are interpreted as hav-
ing a neutral regulatory purpose. If the purpose is not regulatory,
both proposals will fail. If the statutes are upheld, a simple compari-
son reveals the superior alternative. In the implied consent proposal,
118. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971). See notes 96, 102 and accompany-
ing text supra.
119. See notes 95-98 and accompanying text supra.
120. License suspension as a regulatory sanction for failure to identify the operator may,
nevertheless, pose difficulty. Although the traditional view is that driving is not a natural right
but a privilege, see Wells v. Malloy, 402 F. Supp. 856 (D. Vt. 1975), aff'dmem., 538 F.2d 317
(2d Cir. 1976); Anglin v. Jayner, 181 Va. 660, 26 S.E.2d 58 (1943), the emerging view holds that
a person's right to drive is an adjunct of his constitutional right to possess property, limitable
by the state's police power only if reasonably related to the public health, safety and welfare.
See Augustino v. Colorado Dept. of Revenue Motor Vehicle Div., _Colo.._, 565 P.2d 933
(1977). The thrust of the challenge is that although license suspension for drunken driving or
multiple speeding violations is reasonable, suspension for refusing to identify an operator is
unreasonable, bearing no relation to the ability to operate a vehicle.
121. See, e.g., C'est Bon, Inc. v. North Carolina State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 325 F.
Supp. 404 (D.N.C. 1971); Jolliff v. State, 215 So. 2d 234 (Miss. 1968); Finn's Liquor Shop, Inc.
v. State Liquor Auth., 24 N.Y.2d 647, 249 N.E.2d 440, 301 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1969); Hartford Acc.
& Indem. Co. v. Ingram, 290 N.C. 457, 226 S.E.2d 498 (1976).
122. Since the sanction in the proposed implied consent statute is noncriminal, the ques-
tion also arises whether the suspension of operating privileges or vehicle registration for either
six or twelve months is sufficient compulsion to invoke the fifth amendment guarantee. Com-
pulsion is not restricted to fines or imprisonment. The Supreme Court has ruled that a person
shall suffer no "penalty" for his silence, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964), including
forfeiture of goods, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), or loss of livelihood, Lefkowitz
v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973). The broadest
meaning given to "penalty" in the context of impermissible compulsion is "the imposition of
any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege 'costly.' " Spevack v.
Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967). The question narrows to whether a license suspension is
considered a "costly" sanction. Although license suspensions not associated with the ability to
operate a vehicle are not necessarily invalid, Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941); Annot., 86
A.L.R.3d 1251 (1978), the Court has intimated that a license suspension would be considered
"costly" because it concerns "important interests of the licensees." Bell v. Bruson, 402 U.S.
535, 539 (1971) ("Once licenses are issued ... their continued possession may become essen-
tial in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that
adjudicates important interests of the licensees"). Therefore, should the Court view the identi-
fication provision of the implied consent proposal as testimonial evidence, it is very likely to
find impermissible compulsion in violation of the fifth amendment.
license suspension is the only sanction for refusing to identify the
operator. The driver identification proposal, however, provides
criminal penalties, albeit only as a summary offense, for refusal.
Thus, the latter is preferable since it promotes compliance by owners
and facilitates effective law enforcement.
C Civil Proceeding Owner- Operator Inference
In reaction to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling in Com-
monwealth v. Slaybaugh, the General Assembly added a provision to
the Judicial Code a3 substantially readopting the owner-operator in-
ference, but limiting its applicability to civil proceedings concerning
such penalties as license suspension and civil fines.' 24 The change is
an attempt to overcome the major objections of the court in
Slaybaugh, that the inferred fact of operation failed to follow be-
yond a reasonable doubt from the proven fact of ownership, and that
the burden of proof was improperly shifted to the defendant. 25
Although the statute has circumvented the more obvious
Slaybaugh objections,'26 the implications of Slaybaugh nevertheless
cast doubt on the validity of employment of the inference even in
civil cases. While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not evaluate
the inference against the more-likely-than-not rationality standard,
the court's affirmance of the lower court decision can be interpreted
as a manifestation of agreement with the lower court's observation
that modern automobile use patterns make any connection between
ownership and operation unreasonable.' 27 The uncertainty created
by Slaybaugh is critical because the rational connection standard sets
the acceptable minimum for valid inferences in civil cases.'28
Nevertheless, assuming the inference is accepted as rational, the
sanction is limited to license suspension and civil fines.' 2 9 The lim-
ited scope of the statute makes it an undesirable choice. Because the
courts will have to validate the inference as rational, most likely on
the basis of empirical legislative findings, in order to uphold its use
123. Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202, No. 53, § 10(81).
124. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6143 (Purdon Supp. 1979). Although limited to civil
proceedings, the statute expanded the applicability of the owner-operator inference from mo-
tor vehicles only to any conveyance by air, land or water.
125. See notes 72, 74 and accompanying text supra.
126. Because the consequences are not as serious as those arising from a criminal action,
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is not imposed in civil cases. It is replaced by a proof
standard that varies from a preponderance of evidence to clear-and-convincing proof. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 12, at § 341 nn.18-22. Although the new language clarified the desired
effect of the inference through the use of unambiguous terminology, the statute would have
been permissible in a civil action even if it had created a presumption that shifted the burden
of proof to the defendant. See notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra.
127. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
128. See generally Annot., 162 A.L.R. 495, 505-08 (1964).
129. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6143(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979) (inference only applicable
in "any proceeding for the recovery of a civil penalty").
in civil cases, the better-reasoned policy is to reenact the criminal
owner-operator inference. This would permit penalties to corre-
spond more closely to the seriousness of offenses under the Vehicle
Code.
VI. Conclusion
The proper standard for evaluating the constitutionality of a
statutory criminal inference that does not constitute the sole basis for
a finding of guilt is the more-likely-than-not rationality test. Penn-
sylvania's owner-operator inference statute meets this standard and
is, therefore, constitutional. A reenactment of the statute, drafted in
unambiguous language and supported by a legislative finding of ra-
tionality, should survive future constitutional challenge. The func-
tion of the court in cases utilizing the inference is to review whether
the surrounding circumstances support the determination of identity,
as a matter of law, beyond a reasonable doubt.
The proposed driver identification and implied consent statutes
are constitutionally acceptable replacements only if viewed by the
courts as having neutral regulatory purposes. The statutory civil
owner-operator inference, designed to avoid the objections to its
criminal counterpart, is dependent on a judicial finding of rational-
ity. Of the three alternatives, the driver identification proposal is
preferable because the criminal sanction encourages compliance.
Nevertheless, reenactment of the criminal owner-operator inference
constitutes the best aid in the ultimate prosecution of traffic law of-
fenders.
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